Two important requirements when aggregating the preferences of multiple agents are that the outcome should be economically efficient and the aggregation mechanism should not be manipulable. In this article, we provide a computer-aided proof of a sweeping impossibility using these two conditions for randomized aggregation mechanisms. More precisely, we show that every efficient aggregation mechanism can be manipulated for all expected utility representations of the agents' preferences. This settles an open problem and strengthens several existing theorems, including statements that were shown within the special domain of assignment. Our proof is obtained by formulating the claim as a satisfiability problem over predicates from real-valued arithmetic, which is then checked using a satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solver. To verify the correctness of the result, a minimal unsatisfiable set of constraints returned by the SMT solver was translated back into a proof in higher-order logic, which was automatically verified by an interactive theorem prover. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application of SMT solvers in computational social choice.
INTRODUCTION
Models and results from microeconomic theory, particularly from game theory and social choice, have proven to be very valuable when reasoning about computational multiagent systems (e.g., see Brandt et al. (2016) , Nisan et al. (2007) , Rothe (2015) , and Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2009) ). Two fundamental notions in this context are efficiency-no agent can be made better off without making another one worse off-and strategyproofness-no agent can obtain a more preferred outcome by manipulating his preferences. Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) have shown that every strategyproof social choice function is either dictatorial or imposing. Hence, strategyproofness can only be achieved at the cost of discriminating among the agents or among the alternatives.
Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving 6:3 operate on 47 canonical preference profiles, the MUS was translated back into a proof in higherorder logic, which in turn was verified via the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. This releases any need to verify our program for generating the SMT formula. We also translated this proof into a human-readable-but tedious to check-proof, which is given in the Appendix.
THE MODEL
Let A be a finite set of m alternatives and N = {1, . . . , n} a set of agents. A (weak) preference relation is a complete and transitive binary relation on A. The preference relation reported by agent i is denoted by i and the set of all preference relations by R. In accordance with conventional notation, we write i for the strict part of i (i.e., x i y if x i y but not y i x) and ∼ i for the indifference part of i (i.e., x ∼ i y if x i y and y i x). A preference relation i is linear if x i y or y i x for all distinct alternatives x, y ∈ A. We will compactly represent a preference relation as a comma-separated list where all alternatives among which an agent is indifferent are placed in a set. For example, x i y ∼ i z is represented by i : x, {y, z}. A preference profile R = ( 1 , . . . , n ) is an n-tuple containing a preference relation i for each agent i ∈ N . The set of all preference profiles is thus given by R N . For a given R ∈ R N and ∈ R, R i → denotes a preference profile identical to R except i is replaced with (i.e., R i → = R \ {(i, i )} ∪ {(i, )}).
Social Decision Schemes
Our central objects of study are SDSs: functions that map a preference profile to a lottery (or probability distribution) over the alternatives. The set of all lotteries over A is denoted by Δ(A) (i.e., Δ(A) = {p ∈ R A ≥0 : x ∈A p(x ) = 1}), where p(x ) is the probability that p assigns to x. Formally, an SDS is a function f : R N → Δ(A). By supp(p), we denote the support of a lottery p ∈ Δ(A) (i.e., the set of all alternatives to which p assigns positive probability). Two common minimal fairness conditions for SDSs are anonymity and neutrality (i.e., symmetry with respect to agents and alternatives, respectively). Formally, anonymity requires that f (R) = f (R • σ ) for all R ∈ R N and permutations σ : N → N over agents. Neutrality, however, is defined via permutations over alternatives. An SDS f is neutral if f (R)(x ) = f (π (R))(π (x )) for all R ∈ R N , permutations π : A → A, and x ∈ A. 2
Efficiency and Strategyproofness
Many important properties of SDSs, such as efficiency and strategyproofness, require us to reason about the preferences that agents have over lotteries. This is commonly achieved by assuming that in a preference profile R, every agent i, in addition to this preference relation i , is equipped with a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility function u R i : A → R. By definition, a utility function u R i has to be consistent with the ordinal preferences (i.e., for all x, y ∈ A, u R i (x ) ≥ u R i (y) if and only if x i y). A utility representation u then associates with each preference profile R an n-tuple (u R 1 , . . . ,u R n ) of such utility functions. Whenever the preference profile R is clear from the context, the superscript will be omitted and we write u i instead of the more cumbersome u R i . Given a utility function u i , agent i prefers lottery p to lottery q if and only if the expected utility for p is at least as high as that of q. With slight abuse of notation, the domain of utility functions can be extended to Δ(A) by taking expectations-that is,
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It is straightforward to define efficiency and strategyproofness using expected utility. For a given utility representation u and a preference profile R, a lottery p u-(Pareto-)dominates another lottery q at R if
An SDS f is u-efficient if it never returns u-dominated lotteries-that is, for all R ∈ R N , f (R) is not u-dominated at R. The notion of u-strategyproofness can be defined analogously: for a given utility representation u, preference profile R, agent i, and preference relation , an SDS f can be u-manipulated at R by agent i reporting if
). An SDS is u-strategyproof if there is no preference profile R, agent i, and preference relation such that it can be u-manipulated at R by agent i reporting .
The assumption that the vNM utility functions of all agents (and thus their complete preferences over lotteries) are known is quite unrealistic. Often even the agents themselves are uncertain about their preferences over lotteries and are only aware of their ordinal preferences over alternatives. 3 A natural way to model this uncertainty is to leave the utility functions unspecified and instead quantify over all utility functions that are consistent with the agents' ordinal preferences. This modeling assumption leads to much weaker notions of efficiency and strategyproofness.
Definition 2.1. An SDS is efficient if it never returns a lottery that is u-dominated for all utility representations u.
As mentioned in Section 1, this notion of efficiency is also known as ordinal efficiency or SDefficiency (e.g., see Aziz et al. (2015 Aziz et al. ( , 2018 and Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) ). The relationship to stochastic dominance will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.
Example 2.2. Consider A = {a, b, c, d} and the preference profile R = ( 1 , . . . , 4 ), {a, c}, 3 : {a, d}, b, c, 4 : {b, c}, a, d . Observe that the lottery 7 /24 a + 7 /24 b + 5 /24 c + 5 /24 d, which is returned by the well-known SDS random serial dictatorship (RSD), is u-dominated by 1 /2 a + 1 /2 b for every utility representation u. Hence, any SDS that returns this lottery for the profile R would not be efficient. However, the lottery 1 /2 a + 1 /2 b is not u-dominated, which can, for instance, be checked via linear programming (see Lemma 4.5).
We can also define a weak notion of strategyproofness in analogy to our notion of efficiency.
Definition 2.3. An SDS is manipulable if there is a preference profile R, an agent i, and a preference relation such that it is u-manipulable at R by agent i reporting for all utility representations u. An SDS is strategyproof if it is not manipulable.
Alternatively, there is a stronger version of strategyproofness first considered by Gibbard (1977) , which prescribes that an SDS should be u-strategyproof for all utility representations u.
For more information concerning the relationship between sets of possible utility functions and preference extensions, such as stochastic dominance, the reader is referred to Aziz et al. (2015) .
THE RESULT
Our main result shows that efficiency and strategyproofness are incompatible with basic fairness properties. Aziz et al. (2013b) raised the question whether there exists an anonymous, efficient, and strategyproof SDS. When additionally requiring neutrality, we can answer this question in the negative.
Theorem 3.1. If m ≥ 4 and n ≥ 4, there is no anonymous and neutral SDS that satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness.
The proof of Theorem 3.1, which heavily relies on computer-aided solving techniques, is discussed in Section 4. Let us first discuss the independence of the axioms and relate the result to existing theorems. RSD satisfies all axioms except efficiency; another SDS known as maximal lotteries satisfies all axioms except strategyproofness (see Aziz et al. (2018) ). Serial dictatorship, the deterministic version of RSD, satisfies neutrality, efficiency, and strategyproofness but violates anonymity. It is unknown whether Theorem 3.1 still holds when dropping the assumption of neutrality. Our proof, however, only requires a technical weakening of neutrality (see Section 4.1).
Related Results for Social Choice
Theorem 3.1 generalizes several existing results and is closely related to several results in subdomains of social choice. Aziz et al. (2013b) proved a weak version of Theorem 3.1 for the rather restricted class of majoritarian SDSs (i.e., SDSs whose outcome may only depend on the pairwise majority relation). This statement was later generalized by Aziz et al. (2014) to all SDSs whose outcome only depends on the weighted majority relation. More recently, Brandl et al. (2016b) have shown that although random dictatorship satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness (as well as anonymity and neutrality) on the domain of linear preferences, it cannot be extended to the full domain of weak preferences without violating at least one of these properties. Their theorem is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.1. Other impossibility results have been obtained for stronger notions of efficiency and strategyproofness, which weakens the corresponding statements. Aziz et al. (2014) have shown that there is no anonymous and neutral SDS that satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness with respect to the pairwise comparison lottery extension and with respect to the upward lexicographic extension. 4 Both of these notions of efficiency and strategyproofness are stronger than the ones used in Theorem 3.1.
In a ground-breaking work, Hylland (1980, Theorem 2) has shown that the only cardinal decision schemes (i.e., functions that map utility profiles to lotteries) satisfying u-efficiency and ustrategyproofness are dictatorships (also see Dutta et al. (2007 Dutta et al. ( , 2008 and Nandeibam (2013) ). Under the assumption of anonymity, this result turns into an impossibility because dictatorships clearly violate anonymity. When additionally assuming neutrality, this impossibility is implied by Theorem 3.1 because every cardinal decision scheme can be associated with an SDS by selecting some consistent utility function for every preference relation and returning the outcomes for the corresponding utility profiles. This transformation turns a u-efficient and u-strategyproof cardinal decision scheme into an efficient and strategyproof SDS, as these properties are purely ordinal. Hence, Theorem 3.1 implies that there is no anonymous, neutral, u-efficient, and u-strategyproof cardinal decision scheme. Hylland's notions of efficiency and strategyproofness are stronger than ours because he considers cardinal decision schemes.
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Related Results for Assignment
A subdomain of social choice that has been thoroughly studied in the literature is the assignment (also known as house allocation or two-sided matching with one-sided preferences) domain. Assignment problems are concerned with the allocation of objects to agents based on the agents' preferences over objects. An assignment problem can be associated with a social choice problem by letting the set of alternatives be the set of deterministic allocations and postulating that agents are indifferent among all allocations in which they receive the same object (e.g., see Aziz et al. (2013a) ). 5 Thus, impossibility results for the assignment setting can be interpreted as impossibility results for the social choice setting because they even hold in a smaller domain and an SDS that satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness in the social choice domain also satisfies these properties in any subdomain.
In the following, we discuss impossibility results in the assignment domain that, if interpreted for the social choice domain and when assuming anonymity and neutrality, can be seen as weaker versions of Theorem 3.1 because they are based on stronger notions of efficiency or strategyproofness or require additional properties. In a very influential work, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) have shown that no randomized assignment mechanism satisfies both efficiency and a strong notion of strategyproofness while treating all agents equally. The underlying notion of strategyproofness is identical to the one used by Gibbard (1977) and prescribes that the SDS cannot be u-manipulated for any utility representation u. The result by Bogomolnaia and Moulin even holds when preferences over objects are single peaked (Kasajima 2013). In a related work, Katta and Sethuraman (2006) proved that no assignment mechanism satisfies efficiency, strategyproofness, and envy-freeness for the full domain of preferences. 6 Related impossibility theorems for varying notions of envy-freeness and for multiunit demand with additive preferences were shown by Nesterov (2017) , Kojima (2009) , and Aziz and Kasajima (2017) .
Settling a conjecture by Gale (1987) , Zhou (1990) showed that no cardinal assignment mechanism satisfies u-efficiency and u-strategyproofness while treating all agents equally. 7 When interpreted as a social choice result using anonymity and neutrality, Zhou's theorem states that there is no anonymous, neutral, u-efficient, and u-strategyproof cardinal decision scheme. This follows from Theorem 3.1 as described in Section 3.1.
PROVING THE RESULT
In this section, we first reduce the statement of Theorem 3.1 to the special case of m = 4 and n = 4, which we then prove via SMT solving. We present an encoding for any finite instance of Theorem 3.1 as an SMT problem in the logic of (quantifier-free) linear real arithmetic (QF_LRA). For compatibility with different SMT solvers, our encoding adheres to the SMT-LIB standard (Barrett et al. 2010 ). In total, we are going to design the following four types of SMT constraints:
• lottery definitions (Lottery), • the orbit condition 8 (Orbit), • strategyproofness (Strategyproofness), and • efficiency (Efficiency).
Other conditions, such as anonymity, are taken care of by the representation of preference profiles. 5 Note that this transformation turns assignment problems with linear preferences over k objects into social choice problems with weak preferences over k ! allocations. 6 Envy-freeness is a fairness property that is stronger than equal treatment of equals as used by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) . 7 The theorem by Zhou only requires that agents with the same utility function receive the same amount of expected utility but not necessarily the same assignment. Gale's original conjecture assumed equal treatment of equals. 8 The orbit condition models a part of neutrality.
We then apply an SMT solver to show that this set of constraints for the case of m = 4 and n = 4 is unsatisfiable (i.e., no SDS f with the desired properties exists) and explain how the output of the solver can be used to obtain a human-verifiable proof of this result.
Let us start with the reduction lemma before we turn to the concrete encoding in the following sections.
Lemma 4.1. If there is an anonymous and neutral SDS f that satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness for |A| = m alternatives and |N | = n agents, then for all m ≤ m and n ≤ n, we can also find an SDS f defined for m alternatives and n agents that satisfies the same properties.
Proof. Let f be an anonymous and neutral SDS that satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness for m alternatives and n agents. We define a projection f of f onto A ⊆ A, |A | = m ≤ m and N = {1, . . . , n } ⊆ N , n ≤ n that satisfies all required properties:
For every preference profile R on A and N , let f (R ) = f (R), where R is defined by the following conditions:
y ∼ i z for all y, z ∈ A \ A and i ∈ N , and (3)
Informally, by (1), agents in N have the same preferences over alternatives from A in R and R . Moreover, by (2), they like every alternative in A strictly better than every alternative not in A , and by (3), they are indifferent between all alternatives not in A . Finally, by (4), all agents in N \ N are completely indifferent. With these conditions, R is uniquely specified given R , and only lotteries p with supp(p) ⊆ A are efficient in R. Thus, f is well defined and it is left to show that f inherits the relevant properties from f . The SDS f is anonymous since f is anonymous and agents in N can only differ by their preferences over A . Neutrality follows as f is neutral and all agents are indifferent between all alternatives not in A . Efficiency is satisfied by f since f is efficient and the same set of lotteries is efficient in R and R . Finally, f is strategyproof because f is strategyproof and the outcomes of f under the two profiles R and (R ) i → are equal to the outcomes of f under the two (extended) profiles R and R i → , respectively.
Framework, Anonymity, and Neutrality
For a given number of agents n and set of alternatives A, we encode an arbitrary SDS f : R N → Δ(A) by a set of real-valued variables p R,x with R ∈ R N and x ∈ A. Each p R,x then represents the probability with which alternative x is selected for profile
This encoding of lotteries leads to the first simple constraints for our SMT encoding, which ensure that for each preference profile R the corresponding variables p R,x , x ∈ A indeed encode a lottery:
x ∈A p R,x = 1 for all R ∈ R N , and p R,x ≥ 0 for all R ∈ R N and x ∈ A.
(Lottery)
We are now going to argue that in conjunction with anonymity and neutrality (see Section 2), it suffices to consider these constraints for a subset of preference profiles. This is because, in contrast to the other axioms, we directly incorporate anonymity and neutrality into the structure of the encoding rather than formulating them as actual constraints. Similar to the construction involving canonical tournament representations by Brandt and Geist (2016) , we model anonymity and neutrality by computing for each preference profile R ∈ R N a canonical representation R c ∈ R N with respect to these properties. In this representation, two preference profiles R and R are equal (i.e., R c = R c ) if and only if one can be transformed into the other by renaming the agents and alternatives. Equivalently, R c = R c if and only if, for every anonymous and neutral SDS f , the lotteries f (R) and f (R ) are equal (modulo the renaming of the alternatives).
The SMT constraints and SMT variables are then instantiated only for these canonical representations R N c ⊆ R N . Apart from enabling an encoding of anonymous and neutral SDSs without any explicit reference to permutations, this also offers a substantial performance gain compared to considering the full domain R N of (nonanonymous and nonneutral) preference profiles: the number of preference profiles for m = 4 and n = 4 is 31,640,625, whereas the number of canonical preference profiles is merely 60,865.
Technically, we compute the canonical representation R c as follows. Let R = ( 1 , . . . , n ) ∈ R N be a preference profile. First, we identify R with a function r : R → N, which we call anonymous preference profile, and which counts the number of agents with a certain preference relation (i.e., r ( ) = |{i ∈ N | i = }|), thereby ignoring the identity of the agents. This representation fully captures anonymity.
To additionally enforce neutrality, we had to resort to a computationally demanding, naive solution: given r , we compute all anonymous preference profiles π (r ) that can be achieved via a permutation π : A → A and, among those profiles, choose the one π lexmin (r ) with lexicographically minimal values (for some fixed ordering of preference relations). For the canonical representation R c , we then pick any preference profile R ∈ R N that agrees with π lexmin (r ), for instance, by again using the same fixed ordering of preference relations. Fortunately, this approach is still feasible for the small numbers of alternatives with which we are dealing.
Although this representation of preference profiles does not completely capture neutrality-the orbit condition (see Brandt and Geist 2016 ) is missing-this weaker version suffices to prove the impossibility. In favor of simpler proofs, we include the simple constraints corresponding to a randomized version of the orbit condition.
In our context, an orbit O of a preference profile R is an equivalence class of alternatives. Two alternatives x, y ∈ A are considered equivalent if π (x ) = y for some permutation π : A → A that maps the anonymous preference profile associated with R to itself (i.e., π is an automorphism of the anonymous preference profile). In such a situation, every anonymous and neutral SDS has to assign equal probabilities to x and y. We hence require that for each orbit O ∈ O R of a (canonical) profile R, the probabilities p R,x are equal for all alternatives x ∈ O. As an SMT constraint, this reads
Example 4.2. Consider the anonymous preference profile r based on R from Example 2.2 and the permutation π = (ab)(cd). As π (r ) = r (and since no other nontrivial permutation has this property), the set of orbits of R is O R = {{a, b}, {c, d}}.
Stochastic Dominance
To avoid quantifying over utility functions, we leverage well-known representations of efficiency and strategyproofness via stochastic dominance (see Aziz et al. (2015) , Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001), and McLennan (2002) 
When p SD i q and not q SD i p, we write p SD i q. As an example, consider the preference relation i : a, b, c. We then have that 
q(x k ). Let u i be a utility function consistent with i (i.e.,
For the direction from right to left, assume that u i (p) ≥ u i (q) for all utility functions u i consistent with i . Assume for contradiction that p SD i q (i.e., there is x ∈ A such that
which contradicts the assumption.
In words, Lemma 4.3 shows that an SDS f is efficient if and only if f (R) is Pareto-efficient with respect to stochastic dominance for all preference profiles R. In addition, f is manipulable if and only if some agent can misrepresent his preferences to obtain a lottery that he prefers to the lottery obtained by sincere voting with respect to stochastic dominance.
Encoding Strategyproofness.
Starting from the preceding equivalence, encoding strategyproofness as an SMT constraint is now a much simpler task. For each (canonical) preference profile R ∈ R N c , agent i ∈ N , 9 and preference relation ∈ R, we encode that the manipulated 6:10
is not SD-preferred to the truthful outcome f (R) by agent i:
where
stands for a permutation of alternatives that (together with a potential renaming of alternatives) leads from R i → to (R i → ) c . The inequality ( * ) can be replaced by the equality ( * * ) since the case of at least one strict inequality is captured by the corresponding disjunctive condition one line above.
Encoding Efficiency.
Although Lemma 4.3 helps to formulate efficiency as an SMT axiom, it is not yet sufficient because a quantification over the set of all lotteries Δ(A) remains. To get rid of this quantifier, we apply two lemmas by Aziz et al. (2015) , for which we include (slightly simplified) proofs in favor of a self-contained presentation. The first lemma states that efficiency of a lottery only depends on its support. The second lemma shows that deciding whether a lottery is efficient reduces to solving a linear program. Proof. We prove the statement by contraposition: if p ∈ Δ(A) is not efficient, then no lottery p with supp(p ) ⊆ supp(p) is efficient. If p is not efficient, there is q ∈ Δ(A) such that q u-dominates p for all utility representations u R -that is, for all agents i ∈ N and all utility functions u i consistent with i , u i (q ) − u i (p ) ≥ 0 and u i (q ) − u i (p ) > 0 for some agent i ∈ N and all utility functions u i consistent with i . Let v = q − p ∈ R A . Note that for all x ∈ A, v (x ) < 0 implies x ∈ supp(p ). Now let ϵ > 0 small enough such that q = p + ϵv ∈ Δ(A). This is possible because supp(p ) ⊆ supp(p). By definition of q and linearity of u i , we have that for all i ∈ N and all u i consistent with i , Proof. Given the equivalence from Lemma 4.3, a lottery p is easily seen to be efficient if and only if the optimal objective value of the following linear program is zero (since then there is no lottery q that SD-dominates p):
Recall that an SDS is efficient if it never returns a dominated lottery. By Lemma 4.4, this is equivalent to never returning a lottery with inefficient support. To capture this, we encode, for each (canonical) preference profile R ∈ R N c , that the probability for at least one alternative in every (inclusion-minimal) inefficient support I R ⊆ A is zero:
Given a preference profile R and a support I R , it can be decided in polynomial time whether I R is inefficient by checking for an arbitrary lottery with support I R whether it is efficient and then applying Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5. The set of inclusion-minimal inefficient supports can be found by iterating over all supports. For a small number of alternatives, this is feasible even though the number of possible supports is exponential in the number of alternatives.
Restricted Domains
Since RSD is known to satisfy both strategyproofness and efficiency when there are only up to three alternatives or only up to three agents and five alternatives (Aziz et al. 2018) , the search for an impossibility has to start at m = 4 alternatives and n = 4 agents. For these parameters, an encoding of the full domain, unfortunately, becomes prohibitively large. Hence, for m = 4 and n = 4, one has to carefully optimize the domain under consideration, on the one hand, to include a sufficient number of profiles for a successful proof, and, on the other hand, not to include too many profiles, which would prevent the solver from terminating within a reasonable amount of time.
The following incremental strategy was found to be successful. We start with a specific profile R, from which we only consider sequences of potential manipulations as long as (in each step) the manipulated individual preferences are not too distinct from the truthful preferences. To this end, we measure the magnitude of manipulations by the Kendall tau distance τ , which counts pairwise disagreements between R i and R i (also see Sato (2013) ). A change in the individual preferences of an agent will be called a k-manipulation if τ (R i , R i ) ≤ k. Then, for example, strategically swapping two alternatives is a 2-manipulation, and breaking or introducing a tie between two alternatives is a 1-manipulation.
On the domain that starts from the preference profile R given in Example 2.2 and from there allows sequences of (1, 2, 1, 2)-manipulations, we were able to prove the result within a few minutes of running-time. 10,11 On smaller domains (e.g., when considering (1, 2, 2)-manipulations from R), the axioms are still compatible.
Verification of Correctness
The main drawbacks of the SMT-based proof are that (i) one must trust the correctness of the SMT solver, (ii) one must trust the correctness of the program that performs the encoding into SMT-LIB, and (iii) the proof is unstructured and completely unlike a handwritten mathematical argument, which makes it virtually impossible to be checked by humans.
To tackle the first issue, we used z3 to generate a MUS of constraints-that is, an inclusionminimal set of constraints such that this set is still unsatisfiable (also see Brandt and Geist (2016) ).
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A MUS corresponding to Theorem 3.1 consists of 94 constraints, not counting the (trivial) lottery definitions. This MUS, annotated with, for example, the 47 required canonical preference profiles is available as part of an arXiv version of this article (Brandl et al. 2016a ). The unsatisfiability of the MUS has been verified by the solvers CVC4, MathSAT, Yices2, and z3.
We addressed the second issue by performing several sanity checks such as running solvers on multiple variants of the encoding that represent known theorems. This way, we reproduced (among others) the results by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) and Katta and Sethuraman (2006) , as well as the possibility result for m < 4.
To finally remove any doubt about correctness and simultaneously address the third issue, we translated the MUS into an independent proof, which no longer relies on SMT, within the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL (Nipkow and Klein 2014; Nipkow et al. 2002) . Isabelle is a generic interactive theorem prover where interactive means that the prover does not find the proof by itself like an automated theorem prover-the user must give it a sequence of steps to follow and the prover's automation fills in the gaps. This allows proofs of more complex theorems that are outside the scope of fully automated theorem provers. The proof of Theorem 3.1 in Isabelle is about 400 lines long but still fairly legible since it consists of many individual small proofs. The fact that Isabelle can automatically simplify inequalities using all facts proven so far actually makes conducting the proof in the system much easier, less tedious, and less error prone than on paper. Moreover, all aspects of the proof-including formal definitions of the socialchoice-theoretic concepts, the reduction of the general case to that of m = 4 and n = 4, the generation of the constraints arising from the 47 canonical preference profiles, and the proof of the inconsistency of these constraints (which corresponds to the SMT proof)-have been verified by Isabelle/HOL.
The trustworthiness of such a proof stems from the fact that all Isabelle proofs are broken down into small logical inference steps, which are checked by Isabelle's kernel. Since only the kernel can produce new theorems, it is sufficient to trust it to correctly implement these inference steps to trust that any proof it accepts really does hold in the underlying logic. Furthermore, the mere act of breaking down proofs into such small steps exposes many mistakes and forgotten side conditions.
The Isabelle proof is available in the Archive of Formal Proofs (Eberl 2016b) , which is a peerreviewed online repository of Isabelle proofs. For more details on the background in Isabelle and how the proof was obtained from the MUS, we refer to Eberl (2016a) . A human-readable version of this proof is given in Appendix A.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have leveraged computer-aided solving techniques to prove a sweeping impossibility for randomized aggregation mechanisms. In particular, we have reduced the statement to a finite propositional formula using linear arithmetic, which was then shown to be unsatisfiable by an SMT solver. A crucial step in the construction of the formula was to find a restricted domain of preference profiles that is not too large yet sufficient for the impossibility to hold.
It seems unlikely that this proof would have been found without the help of computers, because manual proofs of significantly weaker statements already turned out to be quite complex (see Table 1 for a comparison of the proof complexity of related statements). Nevertheless, now that the theorem has been established, our computer-aided methods may guide the search for related and perhaps even stronger statements that allow for more intuitive proofs and provide more insights into randomized social choice.
Generally speaking, we believe that SMT solving and subsequent verification via Isabelle is applicable to a wide range of problems in social choice and, more generally, in microeconomic theory (see ). In particular, extending our result to the special domain of assignment (see Section 3.2) is desirable, as this would strengthen several existing theorems. Other interesting questions are whether the impossibility still holds when weakening efficiency and strategyproofness even further or when omitting neutrality (see Brandt (2017) ).
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1 A.1 Main Proof
We will now give the complete human-readable proof of Theorem 3.1. This proof is essentially a paraphrased version of the formal Isabelle/HOL proof, which is available in the AFP entry (Eberl 2016b) . Our general approach will be to attempt to "solve" preference profiles-that is, determine the exact value of f (R i )(x ) (which we write as p i,x ) for a profile R i and an alternative x. Whenever this is not possible, we try to express p i,x in terms of other p j,y or at least find simple inequalities that the p i,x satisfy. We do this until we have gained enough knowledge about the SDS to derive a contradiction.
A typical step in the proofs will be to pick a strategyproofness condition (which usually consist of several disjunctions) and simplify it with all of the knowledge we have-substituting the p i,x whose values we already know (e.g., substituting
We will use the fact that all p i,x are nonnegative and that x ∈A p i,x = 1 without mentioning it explicitly.
Every step of the proof (i.e., "Condition X simplifies to . . . " or "Condition X implies . . . ") is elementary in the sense that it can by solved automatically by Isabelle-in fact, the proof printed here is often considerably more verbose and with more intermediate steps than would be necessary in Isabelle. Still, for a human, most of these steps will require a few steps of reasoning on paper. We chose not to go into more detail of the individual steps, as it would only have made the proof even longer and less readable.
The proof will reference orbit equations, efficiency conditions, and strategyproofness conditions on the set of 47 preference profiles mentioned before. As an aid to the reader, the proof contains tables listing all of the knowledge we currently have about the probabilities of the lottery returned by the hypothetical SDS after every few steps.
We start by listing the 47 preference profiles used in the proof by giving the weak rankings of each agent (Table 2) . Now, to begin with the proof, we shall first focus on those profiles that have rich symmetries (i.e., orbit conditions) and restrictive efficiency conditions (e.g., by admitting Pareto dominated alternatives). Table 3 lists profile automorphisms-that is, permutations of the alternatives such that applying the permutation to the profile yields a profile that is anonymity-equivalent to the original profile. Given such a profile, an anonymous and neutral SDS must return the same probability for all alternatives contained in the same orbit of the permutation. To increase readability, the permutations are already written as a product of their orbits-for instance, the first orbit condition states that p 10,a = p 10,d and p 10,b = p 10,c .
There are efficiency conditions of two different types: those derived from ex post efficiency alone assert that Pareto dominated alternatives have to be assigned probability 0, whereas those derived from SD-efficiency (but not ex post efficiency) assert that at least one of two alternatives has to be assigned probability 0.
Alternative b is Pareto dominated in the following profiles and must therefore be assigned probability 0 by any ex post efficient SDS (and thereby also by any SD-efficient SDS):
We will use the fact that f (R)(b) = 0 for all of these profiles without mentioning it explicitly.
Moreover, {b, c} is an SD-inefficient support in the following profiles (i.e., any SD-efficient SDS must assign probability 0 to at least one of b and c):
To see that this is true, note that the lottery 1 /2 a + 1 /2 d strictly Pareto dominates the lottery 1 /2 b + 1 /2 c for each of these profiles.
Using the orbit and efficiency conditions, we arrive at the following conclusions:
• The orbit conditions of R 45 imply p 45,a = p 45,b = p 45,c = p 45,d = 1 /4.
• The efficiency conditions for R 10 state that at least one of p 10,b and p 10,c is 0, and since the orbit conditions state that p 10,b = p 10,c , we have p 10,b = p 10,c = 0. • In the same fashion, we can show that p i,x = 0 for i ∈ {26, 27, 28, 29} and x ∈ {b, c}. For R 29 , the orbit condition then additionally implies p 29,a = p 29,d = 1 /2, and analogously for R 10 . In summary, we have now derived the following information about the profiles: 
• • (S 10,36 ) simplifies to p 36,a + p 36,b ≤ 1 /2. Using this, (S 36,10 ) simplifies to p 36,a = 1 /2 and p 36,b = 0.
• (S 36,39 ) simplifies to p 39,a ≥ 1 /2. Using this, (S 39,36 ) simplifies to p 39,a = 1 /2.
• (S 12,10 ) simplifies to p 12,a + p 12,d ≥ 1, which implies p 12,c = 0.
• (S 10,12 ) then simplifies to p 12,a ≥ 1 /2.
• (S 12,44 ) simplifies to p 44,a ≤ p 12,a . Using this, (S 44,12 ) simplifies to p 44,a = p 12,a and p 44,c = 0.
• (S 9,35 ) simplifies to p 35,a ≤ p 9,a and then (S 35,9 ) simplifies to p 9,a = p 35,a .
• (S 9,18 ) states that p 9,a + p 9,d ≤ p 18,a + p 18,d and then (S 9,18 ) simplifies to p 18,c = p 9,c .
To summarize:
• (S 5,10 ) implies p 5,d ≥ 1 /2.
• • (S 27,13 ) simplifies to p 13,a + p 13,b ≤ p 27,a . Using that, (S 13,27 ) simplifies to p 13,b = p 13,c = 0 and p 27,a = p 13,a .
• (S 15,13 ) now implies p 13,a ≥ 1 /2 and (S 13,15 ) simplifies to p 13,a ≤ 1 /2 so that we can conclude
We summarize what we have learned so far:
• We will now determine the probabilities for R 19 . 
• We now show that p 12,a = p 9,a = p 35,a : -(S 14,9 ) implies p 9,a ≤ p 14,a . Since p 14,a ≤ p 12,a , we have p 9,a ≤ p 12,a .
-(S 44,40 ) simplifies to p 12,a ≤ p 40,a . Moreover, (S 9,40 ) simplifies to p 40,a ≤ p 9,a ; therefore, we have p 12,a ≤ p 9,a . -Combining these two inequalities yields p 12,a = p 9,a .
• Recall that p 14,a ≤ p 12,a = p 9,a . Then (S 14,9 ) simplifies to p 9,a = p 14,a and p 9,d = 0.
• It is now easy to see that each of the three cases in (S 45,31 ) is a contradiction. We have thus shown that the conditions are inconsistent, and therefore there is no anonymous and neutral SDS for four agents and four alternatives that satisfies both strategyproofness and efficiency. Table 4 lists the strategyproofness conditions that were used in the impossibility proof. As explained in Section 4.3, all manipulations are either 1-manipulations or 2-manipulations-that is, a manipulator breaks or introduces a tie between two alternatives or swaps two alternatives. They are a subset of the conditions derived by the derive_strategyproofness_conditions command with a distance threshold of 2 (i.e., the required manipulations all have a size ≤ 2). The first number in the name of the condition indicates the original profile, and the second one is the manipulated profile (possibly with a permutation applied to the alternatives). Table 5 lists the manipulations that were used to obtain these strategyproofness conditions: the first column gives the name of the manipulation condition in the form (S i, j ), which also contains the information about which two profiles are involved in the manipulation (R i and R j ). The next columns contain the manipulating agent, his preferences, and the false preferences that he needs to submit. The last column gives the permutation of the alternatives that yields R j when applied to the manipulated instance of R i . 
A.2 Strategyproofness Conditions

